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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Appellate
Division, stating the court's liberal view toward the sufficiency
of complaints, particularly in negligence actions, in at least permitting the parties to go to trial where the plaintiffs, under other
allegations in the complaint, may be able to submit evidence
entitling them to recover, 12 and no bill of particulars is involved.
Couterclaim in Suit by Partnership
Action was brought by a partnership composed of two general
and two limited partners against its former attorney, who had
been discharged for cause. Defendant attorney set up a counterclaim against one general and one limited partner, as individuals,
for damages resulting from their conspiracy to destroy his professional standing. The counterclaim was held improper because
under C. P. A. § 266
the claim and counterclaim must be between
13
the same parties.
The interesting aspect of the case is the statement of the court
that for the purposes of pleading, the partnership is to be regarded
as a legal entity. 14 The court strengthens its position by referring
to 0. P. A. § 222-a (two or more persons carrying on business as
partners may sue- or be sued in their partnership name), and the
commentary of the Judicial Council in proposing the enactment of
this section, which stated that the old common law concept of the
partnership as simply a group of individuals, for purposes of
pleading, is undesirable."3
Although C. P. A. § 266 liberalized the practice relating to
counterclaims, defining a counterclaim as any cause of action in
favor of the defendants against the plaintiffs, or some of them, the
section did not change the rule that the counterclaim must be by
and against the same party in the same capacity.'6
The court, in the instant case, combines the above two tenets
to conclude that the partnership sues as an entity and the counterclaim must be against that entity, not the individual partners. It
would seem that the court, by its reasoning, has deftly evaded the
plain meaning of C. P. A. § 266.
12. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77 (1930); Faber v. Meiler, 278
App. Div. 849, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 485 (2d Dep't 1951).
13. Ruzicka v. Roger, 305 N. Y. 191, 111 N. E. 2d 878 (1953).
14. Id. at 197. 111 N. E. 2d 881.
15. Eleventh Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, pp. 221, 224-225 (1945).
16. U. S. Trust Co. of .N. Y. v. Stanton, 139 N. Y. 531, 34 N. E. 1098 (1893);
Binon v. Boel, 297 N. Y. 528, 74 N. E. 2d 466 (1947) ; Select Theatres Corp. v. Haris,
Inc., 273 App. Div. 505, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (1st Dep't 1948).
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